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INTRODUCTION
The trial court did not come close to abusing its discretion by allowing
Sean Lewis to testify. His anticipated testimony was adequately disclosed and
~

timely supplemented. And even if the supplement was untimely, RJW was not
prejudiced. Heath's supplemental disclosure explained that Lewis would testify
that "a dwelling requires cooking facilities and more particularly, the structure
needs to be plumbed with a 220V outlet for a stove." (R.2612.) Heath had staked
out this exact position six months earlier in the report of his retained expert, Eric
Hoff.

(R.2580-84.) And Heath's architect was deposed and testified that the

"county defines accessory dwelling units" to require "a range that would require
a 220 outlet or a gas line." (R.1808.) Thus, RJW cannot plausibly claim that it
was surprised by anything Lewis testified about. Indeed, this is precisely why
RJW objected that Lewis's testimony was "cumulative and duplicative." (R.2562.)
But even if RJW could prove that the trial court abused its discretion in
allowing Lewis to testify, RJW cannot meet its additional burden: proving that
the error was harmful, i.e., that it changed the outcome. RJW ignores the fact that
it had the ultimate burden of proving that Heath breached the CC&Rs. As a
result, RJW' s brief inadvertently demonstrates that the alleged error was
harmless. RJW accepts the trial court's conclusion that the "practice and policy"
of Summit County was applicable to this question. (Aplt. Br. at 44.) And RJW

argues that Lewis was the only witness to testify "regarding Summit County's
practice and procedure for determining whether a structure was residential."
(Aplt. Br. at 43, 45.) RJW then concludes: "Without Lewis's testimony, the district

court lacked evidence to determine ·whether the carriage house was a residence." (Aplt.
Br. at 44 (emphasis added).)
That gets it backwards.

To RJW, this means the allegedly erroneous

admission of Lewis's testimony was ultimately prejudicial; but in fact it shows
just the opposite.

Because RJW had the burden of proving that the carriage

house was a residence, RJW' s assertion that, absent Lewis's testimony, "the
district court lacked evidence to determine whether the carriage house was a
residence" is fatal to RJW' s second-residence claim. Nowhere in its brief does
RJW even argue that, absent Lewis's testimony, RJW affirmatively proved its
case. And for good reason: Lewis's testimony did not change the outcome.
Besides that, RJW's assertion that Lewis was the only witness to testify
about the "residence" issue is incorrect.

As noted, RJW moved to exclude

Lewis's testimony because it was "cumulative and duplicative." (R.2562.) And
indeed it was. Two architects- Hoff and Michael Upwall- also testified that, in
their experience with the policy and practice of Summit County, Heath's carriage
house did not qualify as a residence. (R.2809:53; 2810:39-40.) That conclusion
fully comports with the ordinary meaning of "residence" and "single family
2

dwelling," which ultimately governs the interpretation of the CC&Rs. Thus,
RJW is correct that the trial court lacked evidence that the carriage house was a
residence; but there was ample evidence, even absent Lewis's testimony, that the
carriage house was not a residence. For this reason also, any error in admitting
Lewis's testimony was harmless.
Likewise, at trial RJW had the burden of proving that under the CC&Rs
Heath did not get proper approval for his project.

On appeal, RJW has the

additional burden of proving that the trial court's decision on this issue was
clearly erroneous.

But instead of showing clear error, RJW asserts that the

"record evidences exh·eme confusion regarding the plans at issue in this case and
when and to whom various sets of plans were submitted."

(Aplt. Br. at 47.)

Alleged evidentiary "confusion" does not equal clear error, much less prove a
party's affirmative case. And contrary to RJW's arguments, the record is, in fact,
quite clear that Heath submitted "complete plans" that were approved by the
HOA.

Three witnesses, Heath, Upwall, and Michael Stoker, all testified that

complete plans were submitted and approved.
RJW' s effort to undermine this testimony only undermines its own case.
RJW argues that the approved plans were not complete plans because there is
some suggestion in the record that the plans changed after Heath received
approval. RJW argues that the "record is thin as to what took place following the
3

[approval]." (Aplt. Br. at 18.) But that doesn't support its appeal because RJW
can't actually prove that the plans changed-the record is too "thin."
RJW also acknowledges that "there is no evidence in the record that the
plans approved by Stoker and the AC [i.e.; the HOA's Architectural Committee]
are the plans that Heath ultimately had submitted to the county and for which
Heath received a building permit." (Aplt. Br. at 48.) This might be persuasive if
Heath had the burden of proving that the plans were the same.

But again,

because R]W bears the burden, the lack of evidence of any difference between the
plans approved by the AC and the plans approved by the county defeats its case.
Tellingly, RJW offered no evidence that the residence Heath actually built differs
in any material way from what the AC approved. RJW's speculation about the
possibility that the plans changed is not a basis for reversal.
Heath asks this Court to affirm the trial court on both issues raised on
appeal. On the first issue, allowing Lewis to testify was well within the trial
court's discretion and, by RJW' s own admission, any error was harmless. On the
second issue, the decision of the trial court, as the factfinder, is not against the
clear weight of the evidence.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction exists under Utah Code§ 78A-4-103(2)(i).

4
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ISSUES PRESENTED

1.

Sean Lewis was one of three credible witnesses to testify about the

policy and practice of Summit County in determining whether a structure is a
~

residence. As RJW noted, Lewis's testimony was "cumulative and duplicative."
And RJW offered no contrary evidence. Assuming arguendo that the trial court
erred in allowing Lewis to testify, the first issue is whether that error was
harmless. 1
Standard of Review: An error is harmless "if, upon a review of the record,
there is clear evidence to support the trial court's ultimate conclusion." LePet,
Inc. v. Mower, 872 P.2d 470,473 (Utah App. 1994) (quotation marks omitted).
2.

Heath disclosed Lewis as a nonretained expert six months before

trial and gave a brief description of his anticipated testimony.

Heath

supplemented that disclosure after interviewing Lewis. Lewis's testimony did
not introduce any new issues.

And RJW did not move to strike Lewis's

testimony until four days before trial. The second issue is whether the trial court
abused its discretion by allowing Lewis to testify.
Standard of Review: "The trial court is afforded broad discretion to admit
or exclude evidence, and we will disturb its ruling only for abuse of discretion."
Lawrence v. Mountainstar Healthcare, 2014 UT App 40,

1

ir 16.

In reviewing for

If the answer is yes, then the Court need not address the second issue.
5

abuse of discretion, the court "will not reverse a trial court's ruling on evidence
unless the ruling was beyond the limits of reasonability." Id.
3.

Three witnesses testified that "complete plans" were submitted to
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RJ\J\l submitted no evidence that what Heath

actually built differs in any way from the plans that were approved. The third
issue is whether the trial court's finding that plans were appropriately submitted
and approved was against the clear weight of the evidence.
Standard of Review:

"When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of

evidence, we must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear
weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, 1999
UT App 61, ,I 5 (quotation marks omitted).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case. RJW Media, Inc. contends that the carriage house

Chuck Heath constructed violated the CC&Rs. RJW sued Heath for breach of
contract and nuisance, and sought declaratory judgment and an injunction. (R.113.)
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. RJW' s complaint alleged

sixteen violations of the CC&Rs. The trial court granted summary judgment on
13 of the 16 claims. (R.2727-45.) RJW has not appealed that ruling.
6

A bench trial was held on the three remaining claims: (1) whether the
HOA approved the carriage house as required by Article II, Section 2 of the
CC&Rs; (2) whether the carriage house exceeded the height limitations in Article
~

IV, Section 5 of the CC&Rs; and (3) whether the carriage house violated the oneresidence limitation in Article IV, Section 1 of the CC&Rs. (R.3018-20.) Over
RJW' s objection, Sean Lewis, the Summit County planner, was allowed to testify
as a nonretained expert on the third issue. (R.2808:15-17.)
The court ruled in Heath's favor on all three issues, finding that RJW had
not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Heath breached the CC&Rs.
(R.3017-35.) RJW appeals two of the three issues: (1) whether the carriage house

was a second residence, and (2) whether Heath received the required approval
from the HOA.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Facts Related to the Disclosure of Sean Lewis. Heath disclosed Lewis as

a non-retained expert on September 27, 2013- almost six months before trial.
(Aplt. Br. Add. B.) Lewis was listed along with several others with the following
description of their anticipated testimony:
Defendants/Counterclaimants identify the following "non-retained"
experts as they provided architectural, planning, construction, and
or design services for the Heath project. Additionally, these
witnesses may be asked to provide specific architectural design,

7

construction, or general building opinions regarding the Heath
carriage house ....
(Aplt. Br. Add. B.) RJW did not object or ask for additional information.
Lewis was known to the parties because he was involved in the approval
process for the construction on Heath's lot. (R.190.) In fact, on October 25, 2013,

R]W disclosed Lewis as a possible fact witness. (R.806-08.)
After an amended scheduling order, on December 20, 2013, Heath again
disclosed Lewis as a nonretained expert, with the same description that was
previously given. (R.955-65.) RJW again did not object or ask for additional
information.
On March 3, 2014, after "several failed attempts," Heath's counsel was able
to interview Lewis. (R.2666.) Heath supplemented his disclosures the next day
by explaining more specifically that Lewis would testify about what a dwelling or

accesson; dwelling is under the Snyderville Basin Development Code ("SBDC"):
Sean [Lewis] was already included on our wih1ess list and is
expected to testify that a dwelling or accessory dwelling, under the
[SBDC] and the County's interpretation thereof, the carriage
house/ garage is not a dwelling/ accessory dwelling/ residential unit.
Mr. Lewis is expected to testify that a dwelling requires cooking
facilities and more particularly, the structure needs to be plumbed
with a 220V outlet for a stove.
(R.2612.)

8

Cii..

Three days later, just four days before trial, RJW filed a motion to exclude
Lewis.

(R.2556-2618.) RJW argued that the initial description of Lewis's

anticipated testimony was inadequate and the supplemental disclosure was
(.;0)

untimely. (R.2561.) RJW said it would be "severely prejudiced" if Lewis was
allowed to testify, but that Heath would not be prejudiced "because he has
already designated Eric Hoff to testify about these very same matters" so that
"the expected testimony of ... Mr. Lewis is cumulative and duplicative of
testimony that is already expected to be introduced at trial." (R.2562.)
Indeed, Lewis's proposed testimony was nothing new. On September 27,
2013, the same day Lewis was initially disclosed as a nonretained expert, Heath

designated Eric Hoff as an expert. (R.2558, 2580-84.) Hoff's report explained that
the carriage house was not a Dwelling Unit or Dwelling Unit Accessory under the
I.@

SBDC-the exact issue Lewis would testify about. Hoff's report explained:
[Section] 10-11-1.103 of the [SBDC] defines Dwelling Unit as:

"A building or portion thereof containing living facilities, including
provision for sleeping, eating, cooking, and sanitation, and is
intended for occupancy by a family and its guests, independent of
other families; may also be referred to as a dwelling."
The Heath Carriage House does not contain provisions for cooking,
specifically wiring or plumbing for a cooking range, and therefore
cannot be considered a Dwelling Unit. ...
[Section] 10-11-1.104 of the [SBDC] defines Dwelling Unit, Accessory
as:

9

"A structure or a portion of a structure which is used by the owner
of the primary residency or primary tenant as a dwelling for the
private use of the property owner's relatives, domestic help,
caretakers, nursing staff, house guests, or similar users. An
accessory dwelling unit shall contain cooking, sanitation, and
sleeping facilities."
Once again, the Heath Carriage House does not contain provisions
for cooking, specifically wiring or plumbing for a cooking range,
and therefore cannot be considered an Accessory Dwelling Unit.
(R.2584.)
On November 11, 2013, RJW served the rebuttal report of its expert, Rick
Brighton. (R.2586-94.) Brighton offered his contrary opinion that the carriage
house was a dwelling under the SBDC:
The carriage house/ garage contains habitable living space on
its second level. Specifically, the second story includes electrical,
mechanical and plumbing sufficient for sleeping, eating, cooking
and sanitation. As such, under the [SBDC], it constitutes a dwelling
or habitable living space. See Code§§ 10-11-1.103 and 10-11-1.104.
In fact, the second level includes a wet bar and kitchen. For these
reasons, the second story violates the CCRs because it is a second
residential sh·ucture on one lot.
(R.2588.)
Heath filed a motion for summary judgment in January 2014 that raised
this issue. (R.972, 997.) In support, Heath cited the deposition testimony of his
architect, Michael Upwall. Upwall testified that the carriage house was not a
residence because it did not have a stove:

10

You would not be able to install a- I believe the way the
county defines accessory dwelling units is number of cooking- so if
you did a range that would require a 220 outlet or a gas line, you
cannot have that. Could you put a microwave in there and pop
popcorn? Yes. . . . But ... there is no range, which would imply
cooking.
(R.1808.)

And in a declaration supporting his motion, Heath testified that the
carriage house was not a residence because it "does not provide for sleeping,"
there is "no bed," it "does not contain a stove, nor does it have a gas line or 220
volt outlet for a stove," and Heath had "no intent to use [it] for residential
purposes, or as habitable living space, or as a dwelling." 2 (R.1825.)
Thus, when Heath supplemented his description of Lewis's anticipated
testimony to explain that he would testify "that a dwelling requires cooking
facilities and 1nore particularly, the structure needs to be plumbed with a 220V
outlet for a stove" (R.2612), RJW's objection that this proposed testimony was
"cumulative and duplicative" was not off base. 3

The trial court denied Heath's motion for summary judgment on this issue
because of "conflicting evidence concerning the features of the second level of
the carriage house/ garage, such as whether there is a kitchen or a bathroom."

2

(R.2739.)

There is, of course, nothing wrong with cumulative or duplicative testimony.
Having four architects support your position is better than having three.

3
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District Court Rules That Lewis Can Testify. The trial court heard RJW' s
motion to exclude Lewis on the first day of trial. RJW' s counsel argued that
Lewis was "going to be testifying about something that has never been on the
horizon with respect to how the building code is interpreted."
court ruled:
With regard to Mr. Lewis ... that is a close call in this case.
He was disclosed. The disclosure, probably, is a little too generic,
but what's supposed to happen, at that point, I think, is we have a
disclosure. We have these, sort of, generic disclosures that you've
made as a matter of practice.
[RJW' s counsel] got to decide, based on that, whether he's
going to depose these guys or not and it seems, to me, that there,
probably, is some obligation on the part of [RJW], at that point, to
say, hey, I don't have enough information. Please give me more
information. Your disclosure is, in my view, insufficient and, if no
response is forthcoming, I think at that point [RJW] would be wellpositioned to say, hey, these folks shouldn't be allowed to testify.
On the other hand, I'm not sure it's fair to take a disclosure
that is, sort of, borderline and not raise any objections to it until the
eve of h·ial.
So I'm going to allow Mr. Lewis to go ahead and testify. He
was disclosed. Even though the disclosure was borderline, I'm
going to allow the testimony to come in.
(R.2808:15-17.)

The court also expressly ruled that Heath's September and

December 2013 disclosures satisfied the requirements of Rule 26(a)(4)(E).
(R.2808:17.)

12

~

Evidence at Trial Regarding the Carriage House. The one-residence rule
~

of Article IV, Section 1 of the CC&Rs governs the dispute over the carriage
house:
Nurnbcr _and_ Location of Buildings. No buildings or structures shall be
placed, erected, altered, or permitted to remain on any Lot other than one
single family dwelling- together with related nonresidential structures
and improvements.

VP

(R.105.)

The parties agree this provision limits construction to a single

"residence," but disagree on whether the carriage house constitutes a second
residence.
"All four of the architects that testified at trial [Brighton, Upwall, Stoker,
and Hoff] agreed that, to be a residence, the carriage house needed facilities for
cooking, sleeping, and living-in other words, it needed a kitchen, bedroom, and
a bathroom." (Aplt. Br. at 42.) RJW's expert, Rick Brighton, offered his opinion
that the carriage house was "basically, a two-car garage with an office on top"
and that the office contained "habitable space" because "it has electrical service.

It has heat. It has plumbing. It has all the requirements- basically, passes all the
requirements for occupancy." (R.2808:85.) Brighton was then asked about the
SBDC:
Q.
Okay. For purposes of eating and cooking facilities, what are
the requirements, as you understand them? In other words, does
there have to be a stove? Does there have to be a particular-

13

A.
Well, it's not overly defined in the code, other than it just says
eating, cooking and sanitation, which is pretty broad, but eating. I
mean, there's a table with chairs. I suppose you would need dishes
as well.
Once again, it's very capable of satisfying those
requirements.
(R.2808:86-87.)
On cross-examination, Brighton testified that he did not know how
Summit County interpreted the SBDC on the precise issue of cooking facilities:
''I'm not sure what the county says.
definition.

All they say is cooking.

There isn't an elaboration on that term."

That's their

(R.2808:107-08.)

RJW

presented no other evidence on this issue.
Michael Stoker, the independent architect hired to advise the HOA, offered
his opinion that the carriage house was not a residence:
Q.

And how do you reach that conclusion?

Well, for me, a residence is something that includes a sleeping
A.
area. So, you can't reside in a structure such as a garage or an office
without cooking facilities and bathrooms and bedrooms. So, to me,
the dwelling would mean the house, not the accessory building.
(R.2808:181.) 4

Stoker was asked for his understanding of how Summit County applies the
relevant provisions of the SBDC, but an objection to the question was sustained.
(R.2808:181-82.) RJW is correct that Stoker did not specifically testify that a 220volt outlet is required. This means there were three witnesses, not four, who
testified about this requirement.
4
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Heath's architect, Michael Upwall, also testified that the carriage house did
not violate the CC&Rs: "It is a nonresidential structure." (R.2809:53.)
Q.

Okay and what would make something a residential

structure?
A.
If it had the facilities to support life, to live there, to cook, to
sleep, to- I believe the county holds it to the definition of is there a
possibility for, or plumbed, or the intention for a range and either a
220 volt range or a gas range for cooking appliance.

~

Q.

Okay and you know that based on your experience?

A.

Yes.

(R.2809:53.)

The disputed witness, Sean Lewis, testified about how Summit County
interprets the SBDC:

Q.

What are the elements that you use in determining whether or
not a particular room or couple of rooms are a residence?

Residence - we use the definitions as found in the [SBDC] ....
A.
In general, a residence will have three elements: cooking, sleeping,
and living facilities. So, generally, it will have a kitchen, a bedroom
and a bathroom.
All right. Do you consider [a] microwave a kitchen or cooking
Q.
facility?

i

,,..!\

\9

A.
It has been the practice of the department that a microwave,
by itself, would not. It would require an oven or a stove, a
refrigerator, a sink.
Q.
And let's assume I brought you a project ... and it didn't have
a stove in it, but it had 220 electrical outlet in what might be
considered the kitchen area or it was plumbed for natural gas in
what might be considered the kitchen area, how do you look at it?
15

A.
It depends on the situation and the plans. We would look at
those as what the intent are and what is labeled on the plans. If it's
labeled on the plans as storage areas, but there's, obviously, hookups that could be connected to kitchen appliances that are
commonly found, we might consider that a kitchen but, in general, it
all depends on what .it's labeled on the plans and what the plans
state.
Q.
And if it's just a 110 outlet is all you have, would you consider
that [a] hook-up for an oven or a stove, cooking facilities?
A.

Generally, no.

(R.2809:248-49.)
The final witness at trial was Heath's retained expert, Eric Hoff. He also
testified that the carriage house was a nonresidential structure. (R.2810:39.) He
reached this conclusion by looking at several different things, including the
SBDC. (R.2810:39.) He testified specifically that it wasn't a dwelling unit as that
term is defined in the SBDC:

Q.

Okay and how do you reach that conclusion?

A.

One, it doesn't have what is, in my opinion, a cooking facility.
It's lacking a stove or the facilities to put a stove in, whether it
would be a natural gas plumbed into that counter area or a 220
outlet in there, which is typically required, and that's been my
experience in all the different jurisdictions where I've designed these
type of structures ....
(R.2810:40.)

Ruling That the Carriage House Was Not a Residence. The trial court
interpreted Article IV, Section 1 of the CC&Rs as follows: "The Court interprets
16

~

the intent of this provision is to restrict the number of residential structures on a
Lot." (R.3031.) The court then explained that the relevant definitions require
looking at the intent and content of the structure to determine whether it was a
~

residence.

(R.3031-32.)

RJW does not claim this interpretive framework is

erroneous.
Regarding intent, the court concluded: "No evidence has been presented
that the Carriage House was designed and intended for use and occupancy as a
residence or dwelling by Mr. Heath or any other person." (R.3032.)
Regarding content, the court concluded that "Summit County does not
consider a building to be a dwelling if it does not contain a full kitchen, including
a 220-volt wiring or natural gas plumbing for a stove." (R.3033.) The court relied
on testimony from four witnesses. The court found that Upwall testified that
"under the applicable provisions of the [SBDC] and the County's policies and
practice, a structure is not considered a dwelling unless it contains cooking
facilities that require a 220-volt electrical system, or natural gas system sufficient
for a stove or range, and that a microwave oven is not considered cooking
facilities." (R.3025.) The court found that Eric Hoff testified that "[b]ased on his
experience and review of the applicable codes," the carriage house "is not a
'dwelling' or residence as defined under the CC&Rs or [SBDC]" because it does
not contain "a full kitchen that includes a stove and the wiring or plumbing for a
17

stove, in particular a 220 volt wiring or other natural gas plumbing for a stove."
(R.3026-27.) The court found that Michael Stoker testified that the carriage house
"is not a single family dwelling or residence." 5 (R.3026.)

Finally, the court

Mr. Lewis testified that it is Summit County's policy and
practice that cooking requires a full kitchen, including provision for
a stove that requires 220 volt wiring or natural gas plumbing for a
stove or range, and that a microwave oven does not qualify as a
cooking facilities [sic] sufficient to meet the definition of a dwelling.
(R.3027.)
After reciting the testimony from these four witnesses, the trial court
concluded: "The Court considers the policy and practice of Summit County to be
applicable in this instance and since the Carriage House does not contain (and
was not designed to contain) a full kitchen it does not meet the criteria to be
considered a 'single family dwelling."' (R.3033.) Finally, pointing back to both
intent and content, the court concluded: "Thus, the Carriage House does not
meet the 'intended use' or 'design' requirements to be considered a 'single family
dwelling."' (R.3033.)

Evidence Regarding Approval of "Complete Plans." In early September
2012, Heath submitted his first set of plans to the HOA and its independent
As noted above, the court mistakenly found that Stoker specifically testified
that a 220-volt outlet was required. Stoker did not mention this precise
requirement, but did offer his opinion that the carriage house was not residence.

5
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architect, Stoker. (R.2808:144; Pl. Exhs. 4 & 5.) In those plans, the garage and
office were attached to the house.

(R.2808:155; 2809:115.)

Heath's architect

redesigned the plans with a detached carriage house. (R.2809:14, 90-91, 106-09,
~

113.) Heath sub1nitted this second set of plans to Stoker and the HOA in early
October 2012. (R.2809:40; Def. Exh. R.)
Heath testified that these were "full plans, complete plans." (R.2809:12728.) Upwall testified that Heath "could not begin any construction until we had
the plat amendment" from the County and that he couldn't get the plat
amendment approved without approval from the HOA. (R.2809:40.) "So, we
went in with the full package to the HOA to get their approval." (R.2809:40.)
Stoker also testified that these were "complete plans" even if they were not the
final, approved plans: "Well, they, certainly, they weren't finished to go to the
building departinent for a building permit, but they were far enough along for
the HOA and the architectural committee to do a review on it." (R.2808:161-62.)
Stoker reviewed these plans and, on October 9th, sent a letter to Joseph
Tabacco, President of the HOA and chair of the AC, recommending that Heath's
plans be approved, contingent on the County's approval of the plat amendment.
(Def. Exh. R; Pl. Exh. 9; R.2808:157.) Stoker testified that his letter was intended
to recommend final approval under the CC&Rs, not just contingent approval so
that Heath could seek the plat amendment. (R.2808:179.)
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Stoker's letter noted six issues that needed to be addressed. (Pl. Exh. 9.)
Tabacco testified that "Mr. Upwall addressed the issues that Mr. Stoker had
raised in his letter and he did so point-by-point and I was satisfied."

received responses to Stoker's issues and that Mr. Stoker's recommendation was
that the plans, as presented, were good to go for final approval." (R.2809:221.)
Tabacco received approval from the other members of the AC and then sent an
approval letter to Heath, dated October 10, 2012.

(R.2809:222-24.)

Tabacco

testified that "the intent" of his October 10th letter "was to say that the HOA
signs off on the final plans and on the amendments for the plat. The HOA, we're
good to go. I was just communicating that to the county." (R.2809:225.)
On October 11, 2012, Tabacco emailed Heath and told him again that the
HOA had approved his project. (Def. Exh. R.) Summing up, at trial Tabacco was
asked, "Did the architectural review committee or the HOA approve Mr. Heath's
[plans] for development on lot 17?" He responded, "Yes." (R.2809:226.)
Ruling that Complete Plans Were Approved. The trial court concluded:

"The preponderance of the evidence indicates that Mr. Heath submitted his plans
to the HOA and that the HOA approved Mr. Heath's proposed construction
project." (R.3028.) "Mr. Heath was entitled to rely upon the HOA' s approval,"
the court concluded, "and move forward with the construction on the Heath
20

~

Property." (R.3028.) The court noted that there were questions about whether
the HOA fulfilled its responsibility, but said that was not Heath's problem:
Whether the HOA (as opposed to Mr. Heath) fulfilled its
obligations under CC&Rs Article II and Design Guidelines Article II
is not at issue here and, indeed, is the subject of separate litigation.
The Court by these findings does not intend to, and does not, make
any determination as to whether, and to what extent, the HOA
complied with its obligations in this regard.
(R.3029.)

What mattered to the court was that "Mr. Heath fulfilled his

obligations" by obtaining approval before commencing construction. (R.3029.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Two legal claims are at issue on appeal.
~

First, RJW claims that the

"carriage house" is an unlawful second residence under the CC&Rs. Second,
·:, RJW claims that Heath violated the CC&Rs by failing to obtain the HOA's
approval of "complete plans" before commencing construction. RJW bore the
burden on both issues at trial, and on appeal it has the burden of demonstrating
that the factfinder' s conclusions were against the clear weight of the evidence.
I.

Any error in allowing Sean Lewis to testify was harmless.

Even if the trial court erred by allowing Lewis to testify, that error was
harmless. The trial court ruled - and RJW does not disagree-that two factors
determine whether the carriage house was a residence: intent and content. The
~

trial court correctly found that there was "no evidence" that Heath intended to
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use the carriage house as a residence. And three other witnesses, besides Lewis,
testified that the carriage house in fact was not a second residence. RJW' s
argument that "the [trial] court lacked evidence to determine whether the
carriage house was a residence" (Aplt. Br. at 44)- as if lack of such evidence
means RJW prevails-ignores the fact that RJWhad the burden of proving its
claim that the carriage house was an improper residence. Excluding Lewis's
testimony would not have supplied RJW' s missing evidence. Any error in
admitting such testimony was thus harmless.
Alternatively, the trial court's ruling comports with the ordinary meaning
of the terms "single family dwelling" and "residence" and thus satisfies the
CC&Rs. A mere room over a garage- especially of the sort at issue here- is not
generally understood to be a separate dwelling" or residence."
JI

II.

JI

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Lewis to
testify.

In any event, there are four reasons the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in allowing Lewis to testify.
First, before moving to exclude Lewis based on incomplete disclosure,
RJW was required to make "an effort to secure the disclosure ... without court
action." Utah R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3) (2011). 6 Heath disclosed Lewis as a nonretained

Rule 37 was amended in 2015. All citations to Rule 37 in this brief are to the
2011 version.

6
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~

expert six months before trial.

RJW made no attempt to get additional

information "without court action." Instead, RJW waited until four days before
trial and· then moved to exclude Lewis.

The trial court did not abuse its

discretion by denying this motion because it was untimely and failed to comply
with Rule 37.
Second, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the
description of Lewis's testimony was adequate under the circumstances. See
Utah R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee notes. Heath made several attempts to
meet with Lewis but was unable to do so until shortly before trial. Under these
circumstances, the initial description of Lewis's anticipated testimony was
consistent with Rule 26.
Third, there was no abuse of discretion because the supplemental
description of Lewis's testimony was timely. Heath provided a fuller description
of Lewis's anticipated testimony the day after he was able to interview Lewis.
See id. 26( d)(1 ), 26( d)(5).
Fourth, if the supplemental disclosure was untimely, there was "good
cause" for this failure and the untimeliness was "harmless." See Utah R. Civ. P.
26(d)(4), 37(h). Good cause exists because Heath's counsel made "several failed
attempts" to meet with Lewis and supplemented the day after he was able to do
so. There is no harm because Heath's position on this issue was established
23

through several other witnesses long before the supplemental disclosure. Again,
there was no abuse of discretion.
III.

The trial court's conclusion that complete plans were submitted
and approved is not against the clear weight of the evidence.

The factual record supports the trial court's conclusion that "Mr. Heath
fulfilled his obligations" under Article II, Section 2 of the CC&Rs.

(R.3029.)

There was testimony from Heath, Upwall, and Stoker that the plans submitted to
the HOA' s AC were "complete."
approved.

~

There is no dispute that those plans were

And RJW failed to submit any evidence that what Heath actually

built differed in any way from the plans approved by the HOA. Further, harm is
an essential element of a claim for breach of contract. Even if complete plans
were not approved, RJW cannot prove any harm justifying the relief it seeks.
ARGUMENT

I.

Lewis's testimony did not affect the outcome of the trial and, thus, any
error in admitting his testimony was harmless.
RJW "bears two burdens on appeal: first, to demonstrate that the [trial]

court erred by admitting [Lewis's] testimony ... , and second, to show that there
is a reasonable likelihood that a different result would have been reached absent
the error."

R.B.

V.

L.B., 2014 UT App 270,

,r

39 (internal quotation marks

omitted). See also Covey v. Covey, 2003 UT App 380,

,r

21 ("On appeal, the

appellant has the burden of demonstrating an error was prejudicial--that there is
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~

a reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings.")
4Jj

(quotation marks omitted). An error is harmless "if, upon a review of the record,
there is clear evidence to support the trial court's ultimate conclusion." LePet,
Inc., 872 P.2d at 473 (quotation marks omitted). "Even when the trial court has
erred in its evidentiary decision, reversal is appropriate only in those cases
where, after review of all the evidence presented at trial, it appears that absent
the error, there is a reasonable likelihood that a different result would have been
reached." Lawrence, 2014 UT App 40,

il 16 (internal quotation marks omitted).

This court will not "assume that allowing the testimony changed the result."
R.B., 2014 UT App 270,

if 40.

To be clear, as explained below, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by allowing Lewis to testify. But we start with harmlessness because it is the
~

simplest way for the Court to dispose of RJW' s attack on the evidentiary ruling.
First, there was ample evidence, even absent Lewis's testimony, to support
Heath's position that the carriage house was not a residence. Second, RJW bore
the burden of proof and now admits that without Lewis's testimony, the trial
court "lacked evidence to determine whether the carriage house was a
residence." (Aplt. Br. at 44.)
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A.

Even without Lewis's testimony, there was ample evidence that
the carriage house was not a residence.

The trial court found that both the "intended use" and the "design" of the
carriage house mattered when determining whether it was a residence. In its
findings of fact, the trial court noted that "Heath testified that he does not nor
does anyone else use the Carriage House as a residence or dwelling and that he
does not intend it to be used for such," and that his architect, Upwall, "also
testified that the Carriage House was not designed nor intended for use as a
single-family dwelling." (R.3025.)
In its conclusions of law, the court says: "No evidence has been presented
that the Carriage House was designed and intended for use and occupancy as a
residence or dwelling by Mr. Heath or any other person." (R.3032.) In other
words, on one of the two factors for determining whether the carriage house was
a residence (i.e., intended use), the undisputed evidence supports Heath's
position. The exclusion of Lewis would have made no difference on this point.7
As for the second factor (i.e., design), Lewis's testimony provided an

~

additional layer of support, but it was, as RJW noted, "cumulative and
duplicative."

(R.2562.)

The "cumulative" nature of erroneously admitted

evidence is a frequent feature of harmless error. See Sandy City v. Salt Lake

7

RJW relegates this issue to a single footnote in its brief and does not seriously
challenge the trial court's conclusion. (Aplt. Br. at 44-45 n.20.)
26

~

County, 794 P.2d 482, 487 (Utah App. 1990) ("[A]ny error in admitting the
administrative record ... was harmless because it was essentially cumulative
with respect to the evidence already before the court."), rev' d on other grounds
~

827 P.2d 212 (Utah 1992).B
And Lewis's testimony was, in fact, cumulative. RJW acknowledges that
"[a]ll four of the architects that testified at trial agreed that, to be a residence the
carriage house needed facilities for cooking, sleeping, and living." (Aplt. Br. at
42.) RJW further concedes that two of the architects, besides Lewis, testified that
a microwave does not constitute a kitchen and that a 220-volt outlet or a gas
hook-up for a stove is required. (Aplt. Br. at 43.)
Yet RJW still argues that "Lewis's testimony was the sole basis of the [trial]
court's decision that the carriage house is a 'related nonresidential sh·ucture."'

~

(Aplt. Br. at 45.) RJW points to the trial court's conclusion that "the policy and
practice of Summit County [is] applicable in this instance" and argues that "none
of the architects testified directly regarding Summit County's practice and

See also State v. Bundy, 684 P.2d 58, 61 (Utah 1984) (" At best, her testimony was
cumulative. If error was committed, it was harmless."); State v. Thomas, 777
P.2d 445, 450 (Utah 1989) ("In view of the fact, however, that the officer's
testimony was merely cumulative to that already testified to by the victim, the
error was harmless .... "); State v. Wilson, 771 P.2d 1077, 1085 (Utah Ct. App.
1989) (" Although the trial court improperly allowed Ms. Wilson to testify, we
find the error harmless because Ms. Wilson's testimony was either cumulative or
not critical.").
8

27

procedure for determining whether a structure was residential. Only Sean Lewis
~

so testified." (Aplt. Br. at 43.)
With respect, that's not true.

Both Upwall and Hoff testified directly

.
c
· r
.
regar d mg
....,urrim1t
-.ounty, s practice.

Up 1Nall specifically testified that "the

county holds it to the definition of is there a possibility for, or plumbed, or the
intention for a range and either a 220 volt range or a gas range for cooking
appliance" and explained that he knew this based on his experience. (R.2809:53.)
Hoff testified that he had experience as an architect on projects in Summit
County. (R.2810:9.) He testified that he had reviewed the SBDC. (R.2810:11, 39.)
And he was asked specifically whether the carriage house was a dwelling "under
this definition" in the SBDC.

(R.2810:39-40.)

His response was that it was

"lacking a stove or the facilities to put a stove in, whether it would be natural gas
plumbed ... or a 220 outlet in there, which is typically required, and that's been
my experience in all the different jurisdictions where I've designed these type of
structures." (R.2810:40.)
The trial court's written ruling specifically refers to this testimony. The
court credited the testimony of Mr. Upwall:
that under the applicable provisions of the Snyderville Basin Development
Code and the County's policy and practice, a structure is not considered
a 'dwelling' unless it contains cooking facilities that require a 220volt electrical system or a natural gas system sufficient for a stove or
range, and that a microwave is not considered cooking facilities.
28

~

(R.3025 (emphasis added).) The court also credits the testimony of Eric Hoff:

Based on Mr. Hoff s experience and review of the applicable codes and
regulations, a structure is not considered a residence or dwelling
unless it contains a full kitchen that includes a stove and the wiring
or plumbing for a stove, in particular a 220-volt wiring or other
natural gas plumbing for a stove.
(R.3026-27 (emphasis added).)
Plus, there was another piece of undisputed evidence regarding Summit
County's policy and practice as it applies to this case-perhaps the most
persuasive evidence of all: the County approved Heath's application for a building

permit. The trial court pointed this out during the trial:
The Court: I mean, the county approved this, right?
Mr. Egan: Yes, it did. Yes, it did.
The Court: So, presumably, the county doesn't think it's an accessory
dwelling unit ... or it wouldn't have approved it.
(R.2809:49-51.) Summit County plainly did not consider the carriage house a
dwelling or residence, or it would not have approved it.
But in all events, what ultimately governs the legal meaning of terms like
"single family dwelling" and "residence" under the CC&Rs, as RJW helpfully
reminds us in its brief (Aplt. Br. at 46.), is their "ordinary and generally
understood and popular sense." Holladay Duplex Mgmt. Co. v. Howells, 2002
UT App 125,

il 2, (quotation marks omitted). In this context, the ordinary sense

of those terms is "the place where one actually lives" and "a building used as a
29

home." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 996 (10th ed. 1993). It was
by no sh·etch "against the clear weight of the evidence," Bryan, 1999 UT App,

il

5, for the trial court to conclude, after hearing the evidence and inspecting the
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dwelling" or "residence" in any ordinary sense of those words despite the
existence of a toilet, fridge, and microwave.
In sum, there was ample evidence to support the trial court's conclusion
that the carriage house was not a dwelling or residence.
B.

RJW admits it did not submit sufficient evidence to meet its
burden of proof.

It was not Heath's burden to prove that the carriage house was not a

residence; rather, it was RJW's burden to prove that it was. "The plaintiff has the
burden of showing the contract breach .... " John Call Eng' g, Inc. v. Manti City
Corp., 795 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah App. 1990) (quotation marks omitted).
RJW's appeal rests on the premise that the "policy and practice of Summit
County" was determinative, and that Lewis was the only witness to address this
issue. (Aplt. Br. at 43-44.) Indeed, RJW argues that besides Lewis "none of the
11

architects," including its own, were qualified to testify about Summit County's
practice."

(Aplt. Br. at 45.)

And then RJW makes this damning concession:

"Without Lewis's testimony, the [trial] court lacked evidence to determine
whether the carriage house was a residence." (Aplt. Br. at 44.) Because it was
30

Cliiil

RJW's burden to prove that the carriage house was a residence, this lack of
~

evidence is fatal to RJW' s appeal.
And it is true that RJW offered no evidence regarding the policy and

~

practice of Summit County. RJW's expert, Rick Brighton, testified that he did not
know what Summit County's policy and practice was: "I'm not certain what the
county says. All they say is cooking. That's their definition. There isn't an
elaboration on that term." (R.2808:107-08.) Thus, any error in allowing Lewis to
testify is patently harmless because RJW failed to prove its case regardless of
what evidence Heath did or did not present.

In other words, the absence of

Lewis's testimony, which disproves RJW's position, still leaves RJW without any
evidence to prove its position.

Hence, the alleged error in allowing Lewis to

testify was harmless. This Court should affirm because any error in admitting
~

Lewis's testimony was plainly harmless.
II.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Sean Lewis to
testify as a nonretained expert.

In any case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

RJW fails to

acknowledge, much less shoulder, the steep burden it faces on appeal. "The trial
vJ

court is afforded broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence, and we will
disturb its ruling only for abuse of discretion." Lawrence, 2014 UT App 40,

,r 16.

In reviewing for abuse of discretion, the court "will not reverse a trial court's
ruling on evidence unless the ruling was beyond the limits of reasonability." Id.
31

Further, " [a]n appellate court may affirm the trial court's decision to admit
evidence on any proper grounds, even though the trial court assigned another
reason for its ruling." R.B., 2014 UT App 270,

iI 35 (internal quotation marks

The court denied RJW's motion to exclude Lewis for two broad reasons:
First, it was untimely and defective. Second, the disclosure was adequate. The
court was correct on both counts, and this Court can affirm on either ground.
Moreover, there are multiple reasons why the disclosure was adequate, each of
which is independently sufficient to affirm.
A.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying RJW's
motion to exclude Lewis because it was untimely and failed to
comply with Rule 37.

Heath timely disclosed Lewis as a nonretained expert six months before
trial.

RJW contends that the description of his anticipated testimony was

inadequate under Rule 26. The trial court held that RJW had an obligation to
seek additional information and not wait until the "eve of trial" to object:
[I]t seems, to me, that there, probably, is some obligation on
the part of Mr. Egan [RJW's counsel], at that point, to say, "Hey, I
don't have enough information. Please give me more information.
Your disclosure is, in my view, insufficient." And, if no response is
forthcoming, I think, at that point, Mr. Egan would be wellpositioned to say, "Hey, these folks shouldn't be able to testify." On
the other hand, I'm not sure it's fair to take a disclosure that is, sort
of, borderline, and not raise any objections to it until the eve of trial.
32

So, I'm going to allow Mr. Lewis to go ahead and testify. He
was disclosed. Even though the disclosure was borderline. I'm
going to allow the testimony to come in.
(R.2808:16-17.)
Before a party moves to exclude a witness- a sanction authorized by Rule
37-that party must "attempt[ ] to confer with the other affected parties in an

effort to secure the disclosure or discovery without court action." Utah R. Civ. P.
37(a)(3) (2011) (emphasis added). Thus, the trial court was exactly right-RJW
had an obligation to inform Heath that it didn't have enough information and to
ask for more. In fact, RJW had an obligation to certify that it had done this when
it moved to exclude Lewis. Id.
This case presents a good example of why this 1neet-and-confer process is
neces~ary. Its very purpose is to see if the information can be obtained through
~

consultation and good-faith accommodations "without court action." Id. If RJW
had timely informed Heath that his disclosure of Lewis was inadequate, the issue
might have been resolved without court action, including this costly appeal.
Also, the meet-and-confer process prevents the very "sandbagging" RJW
complains of. RJW received a "borderline" disclosure and said nothing. Heath
proceeded on the assumption the disclosure was adequate, until four days before
trial when RJW finally objected and moved to exclude.
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Additionally, a timely motion under Rule 37, after the meet-and-confer
process, protects the court's options for handling the issue, including its
discretion over appropriate sanctions. See Hales v. Oldroyd, 2000 UT 75,

if 15

("Trial courts have broad discretion in determining discovery sanctions .... ").
This is especially important in situations where a court may want to sanction the
attorney who made the mistake rather than imposing a hardship on the client
that impacts the truth-seeking function of trial. See Coroles v. State, 2015 UT 48,

ir

29 ("[A]s a general rule, when the fault lies solely with the attorneys, the

impact of the sanction should be lodged with the attorneys.") (alterations and
internal quotation marks omitted).

For example, if the Lewis disclosure was

indeed inadequate, a timely motion by RJW would have allowed the trial court
to determine if, as an alternative to excluding Lewis, RJW- should instead receive
more time to prepare for Lewis's testimony and then be awarded fees and costs
for the inconvenience.

That certainly would have been within the court's

discretion. But RJW' s decision to not object until the eve of trial tied the court's
hands.

RJW argues that it had no obligation to object or request additional
information. (Aplt. Br. at 33.) That is not the best reading of the rules. As noted,
when a party receives an "incomplete disclosure" it must first make an attempt
to get the information "without court action" - in other words, to ask the other
34

side for more complete information. Utah R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1)(A), 37(a)(3) (2011).
The trial court was, therefore, correct to point out RJW' s obligation to object and
seek more information rather than sit back and wait until the "eve of trial" to
~

move to exclude Lewis. (R.2808:16-17.)
The requirement to seek more information "without court action" for an
"incomplete disclosure," Utah R. Civ. P. 37(a) (2011), contrasts with the harsher
sanction associated with an entirely "undisclosed witness," see id. at R. 26(d)(4).
The difference makes sense.

As RJW points out, Heath's supplemental

disclosure also disclosed a brand new witness, Robert Taylor. The trial court
correctly granted the motion to exclude Taylor because RJW obviously could not
confer with opposing counsel and seek additional information about Taylor
because it had no knowledge he might be a witness. But Lewis, by contrast, was
disclosed and RJW could have asked for additional information about his
anticipated testimony. Instead, RJW treated Lewis like an undisclosed witness.
RJW argues in a footnote that Rule 37, which uses the permissive word
"may," "does not require" a party to move "the court to compel disclosure."
(Aplt. Br. at 34, n.14.) It is certainly true that a party faced with an "incomplete
disclosure" is not required to move to compel or for sanctions: it can simply
accept the incomplete disclosure. But a motion is obviously required if a party
wants the sanction of exclusion. The problem here is that RJW failed to first seek
35

additional information without court action, as Rule 37 requires, and then waited
until the eve of trial to move to exclude Lewis. That motion was defective and

~

untimely, and it was well within the trial court's discretion to deny it.

2015 UT 23. In that divorce case, the husband submitted discovery responses on
June 1, 2007. The wife remained silent for two years and then, two months
before trial, filed a motion to compel supplemental responses. This Court said
the wife's motion was too little too late.
Ms. Dahl did not notify Dr. Dahl that she considered his
discovery requests to be deficient until July 21, 2009. The court
specifically noted that Ms. Dahl's counsel had received Dr. Dahl's
discovery responses in December 2007, but waited until July 2009less than two months before the September 2009 trial date- to
request supplementation or to challenge the _sufficiency of the
responses. And counsel offered no explanation for the long delay.
We cannot conclude that the [trial] court abused its discretion when
it found that Ms. Dahl's motion was "too little too late."

That same reasoning applies here.
discretion by denying RJW' s motion.
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The trial court did not abuse its

~

B.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the
initial disclosure of Lewis's anticipated testimony was
"borderline" but sufficient under Rule 26.

The trial court gave a second reason for allowing Lewis to testify:

the

initial description of Lewis's anticipated testimony was adequate. Lewis was
disclosed in September 2013, with the following description of his anticipated
testimony:
Defendants/Counterclaimants identify the following "non-retained"
experts as they provided architectural, planning, construction and or
design services for the Heath project. Additionally these witnesses
may be asked to provide specific architectural, design, construction,
or general building opinions regarding the Heath project as well as
opinions and facts regarding Plaintiffs' deck, thus these witnesses
are therefore included in this designation.
(Aplt. Br. Add. B; R.955-65.)
The trial court called this description "bo~derline" but sufficient under
Rule 26(a)(4)(E). The requirement is to "serve on the other parties a written
summary of the facts and opinions to which the witness is expected to testify."
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(4)(E). But the advisory committee notes explain that the
11

written summary" will differ according to the circumstances. When possible,

"the summary of the witness's expected testimony should be just that-a
summary."

Id. advisory committee notes.

It does not have to be

II

prefiled

testimony or detailed descriptions of everything a witness might say at trial," but
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should be "more than the broad, conclusory statements that often were made
under the prior version of Rule 26(a)(1)." Id.
But sometimes even less is required. "Not all information will be known
at the outset of a case." Id. And "[a] party is not required to interview every
witness it ultimately may call at trial in order to provide a summary of the
witness's expected testimony."

Id.

Plus, "[f]or uncooperative or hostile

witnesses any summary of expected testimony would necessarily be limited to
the subject areas the witness is reasonably expected to testify about."

Id.

Specifically referring to nonretained experts, the advisory committee notes state
that "disclosures will necessarily be more limited" when the witness is
uncooperative. Id.
Despite "_several failed attempts," Heath was not able to interview Lewis
and did not know what he might say.

Thus, he initially disclosed only the

"subject areas" of his anticipated testimony, precisely as Rule 26 suggests. Under
the circumstances, the trial court's conclusion that this "borderline" disclosure
was sufficient was not an abuse of discretion.
C.

The supplemental disclosure was timely.

Rule 26 requires disclosures to be made "based on the information then
known or reasonably availa_ble to the party."

Id. at 26(d)(1).

If additional

information is learned, the disclosure must be "timely" supplemented:
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If a party learns that a disclosure or response is incomplete or
incorrect in some important way, the party must timely serve on the
other parties the additional or correct information if it has not been
made known to the other parties. The supplemental disclosure or
response must state why the additional or correct information was
not previously provided.
Id. at 26(d)(5).
After "several failed attempts" Heath was able to interview Lewis on
March 3, 2014.

Just as Rule 26 requires, Heath timely- the very next day-

supplemented his disclosure and explained why the information was not
previously provided.
RJW argues for a different definition of "timely."

Supplemental

disclosures are untimely, RJW argues, when "provided to a party at a time when
the party can make no meaningful use of them." _(Aplt. Br. at 36.) But this is not
the definition suggested by Rule 26, which ties the timeliness of the supplement
to when the party "learns that a disclosure . . . is incomplete." Utah R. Civ. P.
26(d)(5). See In re Aramark Sports & Entm't Servs., LLC, 289 F.R.D. 662, 665 (D.
Utah 2013) (supplemental disclosure was timely where served "as soon as
possible").

More generally, Rule 26 requires disclosures "based on the

information then known or reasonably available to the party." Utah R. Civ. P.
26(d)(l). Supplementation is required "[a]s the information becomes known."
Id. advisory committee notes. Further, the purpose of the rule is "to discourage
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sandbagging."

Id.

Sandbagging implies sitting on information for tactical

advantage. Requiring prompt disclosure prevents sandbagging.
And this makes sense. If information comes to light shortly before trial
and
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information was not "reasonably available" at an earlier time, the supplemental
disclosure is timely because the parties will have received the new information at
about the same time. The trial court would, of course, still have discretion about
how to handle the new information, but the supplement would be timely.
Heath was not able to interview Lewis until March 3, 2014, and he
supplemented his disclosure the next day.

Under Rule 26, the supplemental

disclosure was timely.
D.

Even if the initial disclosure was inadequate and the supplemental
disclosure was untimely, Lewis's testimony was still admissible
because any failure in this regard was "harmless" and justified by
"good cause."

Even assuming the disclosures were inadequate and untimely, Lewis's
testimony was still admissible under the two exceptions in Rule 26(d)(4):

If a party fails to disclose or to supplement timely a disclosure or
response to discovery, that party may not use the undisclosed
witness, document, or material at any hearing or trial unless [1] the
failure is harmless or [2] the party shows good cause for the failure.
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(d)(4).
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The failure to supplement sooner is harmless unless "prejudice would
~

result from allowing the disputed evidence at trial." 9 Posner v. Equity Title Ins.
Agency, Inc., 2009 UT App 347, ,I 23.

~

RJW cannot plausibly claim prejudice

because no new issue was inh·oduced in the supplemental disclosure. In fact,
RJW moved to exclude Lewis's tesli1nony as "cu1nulative and duplicative"
precisely because Heath had "already designated Eric Hoff to testify about these
very matters."

(R.2562.)

And that was true.

The supplemental disclosure

explained that Lewis was expected to testify that "under the [SBDC] . . . a
dwelling requires cooking facilities and more particularly, the structure needs to
be plumbed with a 220V outlet for a stove." (R.2612.) Six months earlier, Eric
Hoff's expert report pointed specifically at the relevant provisions of the SBDC
and explained that the carriage house did not violate the CC&Rs because it" does
not contain provisions for cooking, specifically wiring or plumbing for a cooking
range." (R.2584.)
Further, this precise issue was disputed when Heath moved for summary
judgment, which also put RJW on notice that it would be a primary focus at trial.
Heath argued that the carriage house was not a dwelling because it "does not

This is obviously a different "harmlessness" analysis than that set forth above,
which assumes it was error to admit Lewis's testimony and asks whether it
changed the outcome of the trial. The issue here is whether RJW was prejudiced
in its preparation for trial by the timing of the disclosure.

9

41

contain a stove, nor does it have a gas line or 220 volt outlet for a stove."
(R.1825.)

In support of that position, Heath offered testimony from Hoff,

Upwall, and himself on this precise point. (R.1825.) The deposition testimony
from Heath's architect; Michael Upwall; was almost identical to what Lewis
would later say at trial: a microwave is not sufficient-cooking facilities "require
a 220 outlet or a gas line." (R.1808.)
Thus, when Heath supplemented his disclosures to say that Lewis would
also testify about this exact issue, there was no "unfair surprise." See R.B., 2014
UT App 270

if 40. And thus there was no prejudice. Indeed, RJW was prepared

to address this issue.

Its own retained expert, Rick Brighton, submitted his

rebuttal report on November 11, 2013, in which he offered his interpretation of
the same provisions of the SBDC that Lewis testified about. (R.2588.) RJW even
designated the relevant provisions of the SBDC as trial exhibits. (R.2231.)
"Good cause" is also apparent from the record. See Townhomes at Pointe
Meadows Owners Ass'n v. Pointe Meadows Townhomes, LLC, 2014 UT App 52,

,I 13 (question is whether "good cause excuses tardiness"). Heath made "several
failed attempts" to interview Lewis, and he supplemented the day after he was
able to interview him. (R.2666.) Further, it should be noted again that Lewis had
been disclosed, and RJW had not objected. Under the circumstances, there was
"good cause" for Heath's failure to supplement sooner.
42

Giv

In sum, even if the initial description of Lewis's anticipated testimony was
inadequate, and even if Heath should have supplemented sooner, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony because the failure was
~

either harmless or for good ca use, or both.

****
In brief, even assuming the trial court a bused its discretion by allowing
Lewis to testify, the error was harmless. Heath presented credible evidence in
the form of other testimony that the carriage house was not a second residence or
dwelling-a conclusion that comports with the ordinary sense of those terms.
RJW has failed to demonstrate that, even excluding Lewis's testimony, the clear
weight of the evidence requires a contrary conclusion. Thus, RJW' s appeal of the
trial court's evidentiary ruling fails.
In any case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Lewis to
testify. This Court "will not reverse a trial court's ruling on evidence unless the
ruling was beyond the limits of reasonability." Lawrence, 2014 UT App 40,

,r 16.

Given all the circumstances, it was perfectly reasonable for the trial court to
allow Lewis's testimony. Indeed, "[e]xcluding a witness from testifying is ...
extreme in nature and ... should be employed only with caution and restraint."
Welsh v. Hosp. Corp. of Utah, 2010 UT App. 171,

,r

10 (alterations in original)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Even with a totally "undisclosed witness" 43

a much more serious situation than the allegedly inadequate disclosure herethe trial court still "'retains discretion to determine how properly to address this
issue in a given case." Utah R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee notes. See also
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undisclosed witness). Allowing Lewis to testify was not beyond the limits of
reasonability and thus was not an abuse of the trial court's broad discretion.
III.

Adequate evidence supports the factfinder's conclusion that RJW failed
to prove that Heath breached Article II, Section 2 of the CC&Rs by
failing to get his construction plans approved.

On the issue whether Heath breached Article II, Section 2 of the CC&Rs,
RJW does not allege any error in evidentiary or legal rulings. It simply disagrees
with the trial court's factual finding, arguing that the evidence supports its

~

position that the HOA's Architectural Committee (" AC") did not approve
"complete plans" as required by the CC&Rs. As with the admissibility issue,
RJW subtly attempts to shift the burden of proof and claim the evidence is
confused, but once again this tactic only undermines its appeal.

Affording

appropriate deference to the trial court, it is evident that the court's conclusion is
by no means against the clear weight of the evidence.
Here is what the evidence showed:

In early September 2012, Heath

submitted his first set of plans to the HOA and its independent architect, Stoker,
for review. (R.2808:144; Pl. Exhs. 4 & 5.) In those plans, the garage and office
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Gi}j

were attached to the house. (R.2808:155; 2809:115.) Heath's architect redesigned
the plans with a detached carriage house. (R.2809:14, 90-91, 106-09, 113.)
Heath submitted this second set of plans to Stoker and the HOA in early
i@

October 2012. (R.2809:40; Def. Exh. R.) Heath testified that these were "full plans,

complete plans." (R.2809:127-28 (emphasis added).) Upwall testified that Heath
"could not begin any construction until we had the plat amendment" from the
County and that he couldn't get the plat amendment approved without approval
from the HOA. (R.2809:40.) "So, we went in with the full package to the HOA to
get their approval."

(R.2809:40 (emphasis added).) The HOA's independent

architect, Stoker, also testified that these were "complete plans" because "they
were far enough along for the HOA and the architectural committee to do a
review on it." (R.2808:161-62 (emphasis added).)
Stoker reviewed these plans between October 5th and 9th. (Def. Exh. R;
R.2808:157.)

On October 9th, he sent a letter to Tabacco recommending that

Heath's plans be approved, contingent on the County's approval of the plat
amendment. (Pl. Exh. 9.) Stoker testified that the letter was intended not only to
recommend approval so that Heath could seek the plat amendment, but as final
approval under the CC&Rs. (R.2808:179.)
Stoker's letter noted six minor issues that needed to be addressed. (Pl.
Exh. 9.) Tabacco testified that "Mr. Upwall addressed the issues that Mr. Stoker
45

had raised in his letter and he did so point-by-point and I was satisfied."
(R.2809:221.) Tabacco then "specifically communicated [to the AC] that we had
received responses to Stoker's issues and that Mr. Stoker's recommendation was
that the plans, as presented, were good to go for final approval." (R.2809:221-22.)
Tabacco received approval from the other members of the AC and then sent an
approval letter to Heath, dated October 10, 2012.

(R.2809:222-24.)

Tabacco

testified that "the intent" of the October 10th letter "was to say that the HOA
signs off on the final plans and on the amendments for the plat. The HOA, we're
good to go. I was just communicating that to the county." (R.2809:225.) On

~

October 11, 2012, Tabacco emailed Heath and told him again that the
"uninterested Timber's HOA Board members" had approved his project. (Def.

~

Exh. R.)
RJW argues that there is" extreme confusion regarding the plans at issue in
this case and when and to whom various sets of plans were submitted." (Aplt.
Br. at 47.) "But despite this confusion," RJW continues, "two things are clear:
First, Michael Stoker ... only reviewed two sets of plans, and neither set of plans
was complete. Second, there is no evidence in the record that the plans approved
by Stoker and the AC are the plans that Heath ultimately submitted to the county
and for which Heath received a building permit." (Aplt. Br. at 48.)

46

~

On the first point, as noted, there is testimony in the record from Heath,
Upwall, and Stoker, that the second set of plans were "complete plans." RJW
challenges this testimony by arguing that complete plans "must have some
measure of finality- the subject of the plans must be capable of actually being
built." (Aplt. Br. at 47.) From this, RJW makes the leap that complete plans means
"plans for which a lot owner could receive a building permit from the county."
(Aplt. Br. at 47.) That leap is not logical.
The term complete plans shottld be interpreted in light of the purpose of the
provision at issue.

Review and approval by the AC is obviously not for the

purpose of getting a building permit from the county; rather, the purpose is to
"ascertain whether the architecture conforms to the Design Guidelines." (R.19;
PL Exh. 1.) Thus, complete plans are plans that are capable of being reviewed to
determine conformance with the Design Guidelines. Anything that is immaterial
to ensure conformance with the Design Guidelines is irrelevant.
Michael Stoker, who was hired by the AC to advise them on this very
issue, testified that the plans he reviewed were "far enough along for the HOA
and the architectural committee to do a review on it." (R.2808:162.) Pressed, he
reiterated that "they were complete enough for the HOA and their review
process." (R.2808:162.) In sum, the trial court did not commit reversible error by
concluding that complete plans were submitted and reviewed.
47

RJW's second assertion is that "there is no evidence in the record that the
plans approved by Stoker and the AC are the plans that Heath ultimately
submitted to the county and for which Heath received a building permit" (Aplt.
Br. at 48.) This might be persuasive if Heath had the burden of provh1g that the
plans were the same. But RJW bears the burden of proving the plans reviewed
were not complete. The lack of evidence of any difference between the plans
approved by the AC and the plans approved by the county undermines RJW's
case. RJW offered no evidence that what Heath constructed differs in any way
whatsoever from what the AC approved.1°
RJW argues that the second set of plans "were submitted to the AC for the
purpose of approving the plat amendment," and not for the purpose of approval
under the CC&Rs. (Aplt. Br. at 48.). In fact, the testimony was to the contrary.
Stoker's letter plainly recommended final approval of the plans. (Pl. Exh. 9.)

Gg;

And he testified that he recommended approval not only so Heath could seek the
plat amendment, but also so he could seek final approval under the CC&Rs.
(R.2808:179.) Tabacco testified that he "specifically communicated" to the AC

that "we had received responses to Stoker's issues and ... were good to go for
RJW quotes correspondence that suggests the possibilihJ that the plans Heath
submitted to the County differed in some way from the plans approved by the
AC. (Aplt. Br. at 50-51.) But RJW failed to present evidence to the trial court as
to how they differed, if at all, and if there was any difference, whether it was
material to the AC' s review process.
10
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~

final approval." (R2809:221-22.) Tabacco sent an approval letter to Heath and
testified that "the intent" of the letter "was to say that the HOA signs off on the
final plans and on the amendments for the plat. The HOA, we're good to go."
VP

(R.2809:225.) On October 11, 2012, Tabacco emailed Heath and told him again
that the "uninterested Timber's HOA Board members" had approved his project.
(Def. Exh. R.)
In its oral ruling from the bench, the trial court cut right to the core of the
issue.
My task, here, is to try to determine whether Mr. Heath did
what he was supposed to do under the CC&R's to go ahead and get
his project approved and I find that he did. Again, I think he, Mr.
Heath, under the CC&R's needed to get approval. The CC&R's
don't allow him to just haul off and build whatever he wants in his
back yard. They don't allow him to build any kind of home he
wants on his lot. The CC&R's require that Mr. Heath submit plans
to the HOA and get those plans approved and Mr. Heath did that.
(R.2810:193.)
The trial court's conclusion that "the preponderance of the evidence
demonstrates that Mr. Heath did not violate CC&Rs Article II and Design
Guidelines Article II" is not against the clear weight of the evidence. (R.3029.)
Alternatively, even if the "complete plans" provision was breached, RJW
has not proved any harm. RJW has sued Heath for breach of contract, and the
only remedy it seeks is an injunction requiring Heath to tear everything down
49

and start over. Harm is an essential element of a breach-of-contract claim. See
Am. W. Bank Members, L.C. v. State, 2014 UT 49,

,r

15.

Even if the plans

approved by the HOA were not "complete" plans, RJW did not submit evidence

of any harm.
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for example, that ,,vhat Heath

constructed violates the Design Guidelines.
As the trial court pointed out, RJW's only requested remedy did not fit the
circumstances, even if there was a technical breach of the CC&Rs: "Well, let's
assume you' re right" that Heath did not get the required approval, the court
asked during closing arguments. "Why is it tear-down? Why isn't it he has to go
back to the HOA a_nd get that approval ... ?" (R.2810:141.) "[T]his is built and
we have, at most here, a procedural violation. We have-what you're alleging is
they didn't jump through the right hoops to procedurally approve this thing,
and, so, you want me to go back and bring the wrecking ball in. That seems like
a little bit too much remedy for the problem, no?" (R.2810:114-15.)
The remedy must fit the harm. And RJW failed to prove any harm. There
is no evidence RJW suffered any monetary harm. Nor is there any harm in the
form of noncompliance with the Design Guidelines. There is no evidence that
the approval process did not serve its intended purpose of ensuring that plans
comply with the Design Guidelines. Thus, not only did RJW fail to prove that
Heath did not get complete plans approved; RJW failed to prove that any harm
50

resulted from this alleged technical violation.
~

Its breach of contract claim

therefore fails.
CONCLUSION
RJW doesn't like Heath's new home and has raised CC&R technicalities to
get some or all of it torn down. It claims that a mere room over the garage
renders the garage an improper second residence and that Heath failed to submit
complete plans to the HOA. The trial court held a trial, examined the facts, and
rejected RJW' s claims.
RJW now complains about a single evidentiary ruling allowing Lewis, one
of several witnesses on the second-residence issue, to testify. But the outcome of
this case would not have been different if the trial court had excluded Lewis's
testimony.

~

As RJW accurately noted before trial, Lewis's testimony was

cumulative. Other witnesses supplied ample evidence supporting the court's
finding that the carriage house was not a second residence - a conclusion further
confirmed by the ordinary meaning of the relevant CC&R terms. The most RJW
can muster is that excluding Lewis would have left insufficient evidence to
adjudicate the second-residence issue. But if true, RJW still loses because it had
an affirmative duty to supply sufficient evidence not only to adjudicate but to
prevail on that issue. In any case, for multiple reasons the trial court was well
within its broad discretion in refusing to exclude Lewis's testimony. If this Court
51

finds an abuse of discretion here, then that standard will truly have lost its
meaning and this Court will be very busy second-guessing myriad evidentiary
rulings.
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The undisputed testimony was that Heath's plans were "complete." They were
II

certainly as complete" as necessary for the HOA' s Architectural Committee to
perform its function. And RJW does not contend Heath built a home that was
different than his submitted plans. So what is the harm to RJW? There is none.
Hence, this Court can affirm on the alternative ground that RJW failed to prove
damages for its breach of contract claim alleging violation of the CC&Rs. RJW is
certainly not entitled to tear down Mr. Heath's home based on a technical
violation of CC&Rs that was entirely harmless.
This Court should affirm the trial court's ruling and reject RJW' s appeal.
I
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